Fig. 13. — Experiment on June 16, 1884. Magnetic transfer of impulse to write.
MOTOR suggestions present us with a series of experiments which start from a simple, natural, and even fairly intelligible phenomenon, the suggestion of a movement, and culminate in complex phenomena which it is most difficult to explain, the suggestion of acts. Acts do not consist merely of movements, but of sensations, perceptions, reasoning, reflection, and will. The act may be said to be the resultant in which all the intellectual, moral, and motor functions of the individual converge.
The simplest suggestions of movement belong to the cataleptic phase. We have seen that harmony is the chief feature of the attitudes artificially impressed upon the subject.
The expressive movements given by the experimenter to different parts of the body are always immediately reflected in the countenance, which thus completes the expression. Braid clearly saw this influence of the gesture on the countenance, and we regard this fact as one of the finest and most wonderful results of hypnotic experiments. It affords to psychology a valuable source of information in the expressive mechanism o£ the emotions, and it furnishes the artist with a motionless model,
representing with striking fidelity all the sentiments of which man is capable. It has been said that the sculptors of antiquity took women in a state of catalepsy for their models, and there is nothing improbable in the fact. An infinite number of expressive attitudes may be given to the subject, who may be caused to express ecstasy, prayer, grief; suffering, disdain, anger, and fear. If the extended hand is approached to the mouth, as if in the act of sending a kiss, the mouth smiles. If the fists are clenched, the brows contract and the face expresses anger. This reaction of the gesture on the countenance is not only seen in catalepsy but in other states, as, for instance, in somnambulism, and even, although in a minor degree, in the waking state. But the maximum of intensity only occurs in cataleptic subjects, on account of the complete automatism which characterizes this state. The slightest change in the attitude of the limbs produces a corresponding modification of the expression. When the open hand is carried to the lips, there is a smile; when the fist is clenched, there is an expression of anger. Moreover, this reaction of the expression takes place, with whatever rapidity the change in the attitude of the limbs may be effected. If the subject's open hand is taken and moved swiftly to the mouth and again withdrawn, a formal smile is seen on the lips as the hand approaches, which passes away as soon as it is withdrawn. Again, the influence of the gesture on the countenance may be rendered unilateral; when the left hand is clenched, a frown is seen on the left side only, and if at the same time the right hand is approached to the mouth, there is a smile on the right side of the face. Each side of the face thus expresses a different emotion.
It occurred to Charcot and Richer to modify the gesture by acting on the countenance. By means of localized faradization they developed a given emotion on the features, and the body at once assumed an attitude in correspondence with that emotion. When once it has been produced, the emotion impressed upon the features does not become effaced, and the position of the limbs is likewise persistent. It is possible, by graduating the force of the current, to cause the subject to express different degrees of the same emotion. We have seen that in a state of lethargy, all the muscles of the face may be contracted separately, by pressing the finger on their motor points. The experiment of which we are now speaking is of a somewhat different character, and of greater importance in the study of the play of countenance. The excitement is no longer, as in lethargy, localized in the muscle which is touched; it is communicated to the other facial muscles, which must also be brought into play in order to produce the desired expression.
It has often been asked what is occurring in the mind of the cataleptic subject, when he is- placed in an emotional attitude. There is a curious contrast between his statuesque immobility and the tragic expression of his countenance; in one sense he appears to see and hear nothing, and in another he displays intense emotion. It occurred to Richer to resolve the problem by consulting the respiratory tracings of the subject under experiment. He effected the contraction of the muscles which express terror, and, strange to say, while the features and gestures of the subject expressed the most lively alarm, the breathing, after one abrupt act of expira-
tion, resumed the calmness and immobility characteristic of catalepsy. Hence we may infer that in the cataleptic subject suggestions by the muscular sense are more superficial than the suggestions of somnambulism.
The chief conclusion to be drawn from these studies is the influence exerted on psychical activity by the expressive movements of the countenance and of the whole body. The expression is not merely an external sign of the emotion, but it forms an integral part of it. Even in the normal state, when an expression is artificially produced, it gives rise to the corresponding emotion, which passes away when the expression changes. Dugald Stewart's remarks on this subject have been often quoted. He observes that just as every mental emotion produces a sensible effect on the body, so when the countenance assumes the expression of any strong emotion, accompanied by analogous gestures, the emotion corresponding with this artificial expression is .in some degree felt. Burke asserted that he had often experienced the awakening of the passion of anger in proportion as he assumed the external signs of that passion, and Stewart did not doubt that in the case of many individuals the same experiment would afford the same results. Burke also remarked that when Campanella, a celebrated philosopher and great physiognomist, wished to know what was passing in the mind of another person, he imitated, as well as he could, the attitude and countenance of the person in question, and at the same time he concentrated his attention on his own emotions.
Suggestions of attitude constitute the simplest form of automatism. A given number of co-ordinated movements may moreover be produced in some cataleptic
subjects by placing their limbs in a certain position.
For instance, if his hand is approached to his nose, the subject will blow his nose. Or certain impulses, which may be indefinitely prolonged, may be impressed on his limbs, as when the subject is made to twirl his thumbs, he will continue this automatic movement until it is stopped mechanically or by suggestion. These phenomena are simply automatic, and can be explained in great measure by the laws of the association of movements.
A higher form of automatism consists in what Heidenhain calls imitative automatism. The experimenter begins by looking fixedly at the subject, so as to arrest his gaze, and then draws back. The subject rises to follow the experimenter, of whom he never loses sight, and he imitates his every movement, whatever it may be. In this way he can be made to laugh, whistle, sing, blow his nose, clap his hands and feet together. The subject reflects the acts of the experimenter as a mirror might do; he imitates with his right hand the movements of the experimenter's left hand, who stands opposite to him. Despine has termed this phenomenon specular imitation.
Automatism may also be produced by the recollection of the use of an object. This is a less direct process, and the automatism is more complex. For instance, if a cake of soap is placed in the hands of a cataleptic subject, he rubs his hands, as if in the act of washing them. If an umbrella is given to him, he opens it, shivering, as if sensible of the coming storm. Sight, or contact with the object, automatically arouses a series of movements which are in the normal state associated with the same sensory impression. The subject relies on a basis of habits, and
invents nothing. An unknown object produces no suggestion.
This is not the place for insisting on the analogies which exist between the movements, acts, and suggested ideas of hypnotic subjects and the spasmodic movements and ideas of the insane. We will only remark that in the case of the latter, an impulsive act is not unfrequently induced by the sight of an appropriate object. Max Simon gives an instance of a learned man who was seized by an overwhelming impulse to cut his throat when he was shaving, and who could only overcome it by desisting from this operation. Many other analogous facts might be cited.
Certain acts which are not purely mechanical cannot be suggested merely by the presence of the instrument which effects them. The act of writing, for instance, not only involves the exercise of the hand which traces the characters, but of the thought which co-ordinates the words in a given sequence. If, during the cataleptic state, a pen is placed between B—'s fingers, she holds it loosely, and at the end of a few moments lets it drop, without making any attempt to use it. If a sentence is dictated to her while she holds the pen, a word at a time, or still better, a syllable at a time, she may be induced to write a phrase or two in her own orthography, but the writing is irregular, since it is due to the influence of successive suggestions which are disconnected in the subject's mind. Yet if care is taken about the position of the hand, an autograph may be obtained which can hardly be distinguished from those which are written in the waking state.
There are several proofs of the absence of design.
The subject to whom soap is given will go on washing his hands indefinitely, and on one occasion the operation was protracted for two hours (Regnard). If a subject is putting on her boot, she will go on doing up and undoing the laces for an indefinite period, and if a piece of crochet work is given her, she will make a long chain of loop-stitch without attaching it to the rest of the work. Sometimes the act which is begun is continued indefinitely, owing to contact with the object which suggests the idea of employing it. More frequently, when the suggestion is exhausted, the subject stops short and becomes rigid in catalepsy. A species of oscillation may be observed between the cataleptic attitude and the psychical phenomena produced by suggestion. While the subject is affected by the suggestion, catalepsy ceases; as soon as the suggestion comes to an end, catalepsy reappears.
During the automatic activity it is possible to affect the subject unilaterally. Take a subject, for instance, before whom are placed a jug and basin and some soap. As soon as her eyes are attracted to these objects the subject, with apparent spontaneity, pours water into the basin, takes the soap and washes her hands with scrupulous care. If one of her eyes is then closed, the same side of the body becomes lethargic, while the other hand continues to exert the same movements. So, again, when the subject is working crochet and one eye is closed, the corresponding hand becomes motionless, while the other continues to exercise the same movements alone, although' they are rendered useless by its isolation. Yet, as Richer observes, the intelligence seems to take some part in the unilateral movements; the subject tries to supply
the place of the missing hand by supporting the other on the knee or breast. , None of these phenomena are peculiar to catalepsy: they may all be readily reproduced in somnambulism. But in catalepsy the movements are simpler and more automatic; the impulse seems to be irresistible.
It may be profitable to consider the facts of automatic imitation which are so readily produced in the cataleptic state; the echoing of any utterance, or echolalia. It is long since pathologists became acquainted with this phenomenon, which was discovered by Berger in the case of hypnotic subjects. It is produced in a somnambulist by applying the hand to the forehead or to the nape of the neck; the subject, who up to that time has answered the questions put to him with distinctness, at once repeats, instead of replying to the questions, as if he were transformed into a phonograph. He may be made to sing, scream, cough or sneeze; he will repeat words uttered in languages unknown to him, with an exactness which is often surprising. Some subjects also retain tunes, and may be made to sing a musical air; if a vibrating tuning-fork is applied to the ear, the subject reproduces the sound, with its pitch and quality. In this state also the subject automatically imitates all the gestures of the experimenter (Charcot).
Marie and Azoulay* have measured the period of reaction in echolalia. They adopted the following arrangement. A telephone was applied to the subject's ear, and his mouth was provided with a mouthpiece, so constructed that when the word "toc" was uttered by the subject, an electric signal was given by Marey's
tambour. At the other end the fixed telephone was inserted in a circuit which included an electric contact and one of Deprez's signals, also registering on the same cylinder. Thus, when the electric contact took place, a sound in the telephone and a signal on the cylinder were simultaneously produced. The subject said "toc," whenever he heard the sound in the telephone, so as to give the period of personal reaction, as far as his auditory impressions were concerned.
In the waking state this period was 39/100 of a second.
In the somnambulist state 33/100 of a second.
In echolalia 31/100 of a second.
Acts only differ from movements in their complexity.
Acts consist of associated movements, adapted by the subject to the end which he has in view. We wish to study these acts in the phase of somnambulism. Verbal suggestion is the process usually employed.
Heidenhain observed that when he said to his hypnotized brother, "If I had a watch, I should like to see what o'clock it is," no effects ensued. But if he said, " Show me your watch," the order was at once obeyed. We have been successful in giving such orders in writing. As soon as the subject read the words: "I am going to rise," he arose. In short, the only necessary condition is that the image of the act in question should be distinctly formed in the subject's mind. To give an idea of the mathematical precision with which the suggested act is executed on awaking, one of the present writers performed the following experiment.
We showed to the somnambulist an imaginary spot on a smooth surface, which we could only afterwards ascertain by means of careful measurement, and we ordered her to stick a penknife into this spot when she awoke. She executed the order without hesitation and with absolute correctness: a criminal act would have been as punctually executed.*
It is interesting to ascertain whether the subject who is actuated by an irresistible impulse behaves like an automaton subsisting on a basis of the past, on his memory and habits, or if, on the contrary, the subject is capable of reflection and of reasoning like a normal individual. This latter is more frequently the case. When care is taken to suggest a somewhat complex act, for the performance of which some combination is necessary, we may observe that the subject invents such combined expedients although they had not been suggested to him, and this inventive process shows that everything is not explained by comparing him to an automaton. For instance, it was suggested to a subject that she should poison X— with a glass of pure water which was said to contain poison. The suggestion did not indicate in what way the crime was to be committed. The subject offered the glass to X— , and invited him to drink by saying, "Is it not a hot day?" (It was in summer.) We ordered another subject to steal a pockethandkerchief from one of the persons present. The subject was hardly awake when she feigned dizziness, and staggering towards X— , she fell against him and hastily snatched his handkerchief. When a similar theft was suggested to a third subject, she approached X—,
and abruptly asked him what he had on his hand. While X—, somewhat startled, looked at his hand, his handkerchief disappeared. None of these expedients were suggested, but were derived by the subjects from their own resources. These complex phenomena cannot be referred to the simple fact that the image of a movement produces that movement; such a rudimentary explanation can only apply to elementary experiments.
There are numerous instances of resistance in hypnotized subjects. The order is disregarded, and not executed by the subject. The failure may arise from two different causes, derived either from the experimenter or from his subject. In the former case, as one of the present writers has already observed, the promptness and energy with which the act is performed depends on the authority with which the suggestion is given. When the order is given gently and indecisively, the subject awakes in a state of mind which it is interesting to study. She is uneasy, beset by the fixed idea that she has to do something which is absurd or revolting — to embrace a skull, for example. She hesitates long, and sometimes even expresses her hesitation, saying, "I must be mad, to wish to embrace a skull. It is absurd; I do not wish to do it, and yet it seems impossible to resist." And eventually she does it. It should be added that the personality of the experimenter has some share in the efficacy of the suggestion; a subject may resist an order given by one person, and obey the same order given by another. These facts were known to the early magnetizers, and they recommended the experimenter to use an authoritative tone, and the subject to be perfectly submissive.
At another time the subject's resistance may be due
to the nature of the suggested act. This resistance may be said to be a survival of the subject's personality; his personal reaction which is not completely destroyed by the hypnotic sleep. Such resistance occurs most frequently in those affected by profound hypnotism, and it is more common in some states than in others. We have already observed the automatism of the somnambulant state is much less absolute than that of catalepsy; the cataleptic subject is a machine, the somnambulist is a person. The first readily performs all the acts suggested, while the second often offers a resistance which may become troublesome to the experimenter.
Many subjects display their honesty by refusing to commit the thefts suggested to them. They assign various motives for the refusal. Sometimes the subject may reply: "No, I will not steal; I am no thief." Sometimes the motive is not so high. Many subjects reply to the suggestion by saying frankly, "Some one will see me." The suggestions of murder may provoke similar objections. If Z— is armed with a paper-knife, and ordered to kill X—, she says, "Why should I do it? He has done me no harm." But if the experimenter insists, this slight scruple may be overcome, and she soon says, ''If it must be done, I will do it." On awaking, she regards X— with a perfidious smile, looks about her, and suddenly strikes him with the supposed dagger. But neither this subject nor any other could be impelled to murder some unspecified person. Another of our subjects presented an interesting example of invincible resistance. She had been deeply attached to a young man, and although she had suffered much from him, the passion was not extinct. If the presence
of this man was evoked, she instantly displayed signs of great distress, and attempted to escape, but it was impossible to induce her to do anything which might be injurious to him whose victim she had been. Yet she automatically obeyed every other command. Another subject cannot be induced to repeat a prayer; a second will not sing a song which she has composed, reflecting on one of the present writers; a third resists the order to sign a cheque for a million francs, and will only do so for a much smaller sum.
Some hypnotized persons have the illusion of resistance, and believe that they can resist if they please. These illusions do not occur when the sleep is profound, and we have not met with them in our subjects, but Richet has observed them in some cases. He writes: "One of my friends, who was drowsy but not quite asleep, carefully studied this phenomenon of incapacity, combined with the illusion of capacity. When I prescribed a movement, he always performed it, even although he had, before he was magnetized, been determined to resist. He found this hard to understand when he awoke, and said that he certainly could have resisted, only he did not wish to do so. Sometimes he was inclined to believe that he was simulating. 'When I am asleep,' he said, 'I feign automatism, although I believe that I might act otherwise. I begin with the firm determination not to simulate, but as soon as I am asleep it seems that, in spite of myself, simulation begins.' It is evident that this mode of simulating a phenomenon does not differ from the real phenomenon. The automatism is proved by the simple fact that in all good faith persons act like automata. It matters little
that they believe themselves capable of resistance, since as a fact they do not resist. This is what we have to consider, not their illusion as to their imaginary power of resistance." *
Among the psychical phenomena which accompany the motor impulse that is suggested, there is perhaps none more interesting than the apparent motives which the subject assigns to his act. These facts show, as the illusion of resistance has already shown, that the subject is altogether ignorant of the original source of the impulse he has received. When the subject awakes, and performs the act which was suggested to him during somnambulism, he generally supposes it to be spontaneous; the suggested act, imposed by the will of another, seems to him of precisely the same nature as those acts which he performs of his own initiative. And again, since he is unaware of the true cause of action, the subject invents a motive, more or less plausible or ingenious, to explain to himself the reason of his conduct. Richet was the first to make a regular study of this phenomenon, and we give some of his observations: "When B— was hypnotized, I said to her: 'On awakening, you will take the shade off the lamp.' I awoke her, and when we had conversed for a few minutes, she said: 'We do not see well,' and she took off the shade. Another time I said to B—, 'When you awake, you will put a good deal of sugar in your tea.' I awoke her, tea was served, and she filled her cup with sugar. Some one asked what she was about. 'I am putting in the sugar.' ' But you put in too much.' — 'Really! that is a pity.' And she continued to put it in. Then she said, on finding
the tea undrinkable: 'What would you have? It was a stupid thing to do; but have you never done anything stupid?'"*
An analogous observation was made by one of the present writers. Together with M. B—, whose first visit to the Salpêtrière was made on that day, we performed some hypnotic experiments on one of Charcot's hystero-epileptic patients. When the subject was in a state of somnambulism, I ordered her on awakening to stab M. B— with the pasteboard knife I put into her hand. As soon as she awoke, she rushed towards him and struck him in the region of the heart. M. B feigned to fall down. I then asked the subject why she had killed this man. She looked at him fixedly for a moment, and then replied with an expression of ferocity, "He is an old villain, and wished to insult me."+
It is evident that there was in this case no substantial motive for the crime, nor had any motive been suggested to her. When the crime was accomplished, the subject hesitated for a moment before assigning a motive; her conscience was at fault, and she questioned the outward aspect of her victim. No great power of observation was necessary in order to note M. B— 's sprightly expression of countenance, and this was enough to supply the answer. He had not struck nor robbed her, and since there was no other reason for stabbing him, an insult must have been the cause, since she would not have done such a thing without a reason. It must
be remembered that epileptic subjects, when they have involuntarily committed a crime may, like the subjects of suggestion, not only admit their guilt, but explain it by more or less rational motives. This is only another proof that experiments in hypnotism are valuable in the treatment of mental diseases.* We may add that a suggested impulse resembles the irresistible impulses of some insane persons in two important features: the subject's anguish when he is restrained from accomplishing the act, and his relief when it is accomplished.
Suggestions which are not to be at once acted upon are possible in the case of acts as well as of hallucinations. Richet was the first to call attention to these experiments.+ "When B— was hypnotized," he writes, "I said to her: 'You will come here on a given day and at a given hour.' When she awoke she had forgotten these words, and she asked when I wished to see her again. I said: 'Whenever you can come; any day next week.' — 'At what o'clock ?' — 'Whenever you please.' And she came regularly, with surprising punctuality, at the date and time indicated by the suggestion. This phenomenon sometimes leads to absurd consequences. A— arrived one day at the hour agreed upon during hypnotism, and the first thing she said was: 'I do not know why I came. The weather is horrible, and I had visitors. I had to run to get here in time, and I cannot stay. I must go back in a few moments. It is absurd, since I do not understand why I came. Is this another phenomenon of magnetism?'"
These experiments give rise to the same difficulties as the hallucinations which occur at a fixed date, and we need not go over the question again. The only point peculiar to suggestions of command is that up to the moment which has been fixed, the subject does not perform the act enjoined, even when led up to it and reminded of the order. Suppose that a subject is told that at five o'clock on the following day he will read page 8 of this book. On awaking, the book is presented to him, open at the page just indicated, but it suggests nothing to him. The suggestion is only realized at the given hour, and cannot be realized until that hour arrives.* It cannot be denied that all these facts have disquieting consequences with respect to the existence of free-will. Psychologists of the spiritualist school have long regarded the sense of liberty with which we all perform a voluntary act as a proof of free-will. The history of suggested impulses show what is the value of this subjective sense, which has been exalted into an objective proof, and which is perhaps only an illusion. Philosophers will have to ask themselves what confidence can be placed in what Leibnitz termed "the lively internal sense of freedom," since this sense may be so greatly deceived. Spinoza's profound remark on this subject must be remembered: "The consciousness of free-will is only ignorance of the causes of our acts." It must be admitted that these words are perfectly applicable to the acts produced by hypnotic suggestion; the subject believes himself to act freely, because he has forgotten the suggestion by which he is impelled. It may be asked whether we can reason from a hypnotic patient to a man
of sane and normal mind. Some philosophers may accept this as a mode of escape, and we cannot go more deeply into the question. But we think that at any rate the experience of hypnotism proves one important fact, that the testimony of our inner consciousness is not infallible.
We have not yet dwelt upon the form in which the suggestion is given. For the most part the act to be performed is simply indicated: "When you awake you will clap your hands." The wish to perform the act may also be suggested. "You are very angry with X—, and when you awake, you intend to strike him." A suggestion of incapacity may also be substituted for the suggestion of will: "I order you to strike X—, and however much you resist, you will be obliged to obey." In all these cases the result is the same, and the act suggested is performed. From the psychical point of view there is, however, a wide difference between the agent who performs an action because he wishes it, and the agent who obeys the irresistible will of another person. Yet hypnotism shows that this difference is merely superficial. In both cases there is what may be called in psychological terms the same impulse, and in physiological terms the same dynamic state of the motor centres. We were confronted with a similar fact in the study of hallucinations. Hallucination, memory, and sensation, as we then observed, are clearly founded on the same physiological act, which takes place in the same region of the cerebrum. They are only distinguished by the secondary states of consciousness which accompany the formation of the image. In memory, this state consists in the reasoning which localizes the image
in the past. In hallucination and in sensation, these states consist in the reasoning which localizes the image in the external world. But these localizations in time and space are superadded acts, which are not essential and are often absent. We believe that it is the same with volition. The impulse is the fundamental fact, around which may be grouped the secondary states of consciousness which make the impulse a voluntary or involuntary act, or which assign to it a given motive. These are accessory and superadded phenomena, not integral parts of the occurrence.
Finally, we must indicate the relation which exists between cataleptic attitudes and the attitudes produced by a suggestion given during somnambulism. By suggestion a subject may be induced to maintain a given attitude for some time, as he does during catalepsy. This retention of attitudes under the influence of an idea cannot last indefinitely; its duration depends upon many circumstances, and chiefly upon the muscular strength of the subject, and on the form of the suggestion. If the subject is merely ordered to keep his arm horizontally extended, the arm soon begins to tremble, and respiration becomes irregular. In one debilitated subject the trembling was very marked, and the arm dropped in two minutes. But if this subject was told that her arm was made of wood, then the extended arm did not precisely tremble, but was affected by slow oscillations which moved the whole limb, and it only dropped at the end of three minutes. Consequently the attitudes imposed on our subjects by suggestion differ from those impressed upon them during catalepsy, a difference which proves that the catalepsy
of these subjects is not a state produced by suggestion. But we do not wish to assert that by subjecting patients to repeated experiments in suggestion, it might not be possible to give them attitudes resembling those of true catalepsy.
We have submitted to the action of the magnet the unilateral form of the acts and movements suggested during hypnotism, and we have ascertained that these unilateral phenomena may be transferred like hallucinations, and other physical symptoms of hypnotism.*
After hypnotizing one of our subjects, we placed a bust of Gall on a table standing near. We then suggested that she should make a long nose at the bust with her left hand. A magnet was placed close to her right hand. On awaking, the subject, as soon as she saw the bust, made a long nose at it with her left hand; after the lapse of a few seconds she began again, and repeated the gesture fourteen times, always with the left hand. The latter movements were more faintly executed, and the gesture was not fully carried out; she only raised her hand as high as her mouth, without extending the fingers. A slight tremulous motion then began in the right hand, and the left hand remained still. The subject appeared to be uneasy, and turned her head from one side to another; she addressed the bust, saying: "How offensive that man is!" She scratched her ear with the right hand and then began a series of the same gestures as before with that hand,
which went on for ten minutes. She admitted that it was absurd to make such gestures, yet if she paused for an instant, it was only necessary for the experimenter to make a long nose at the bust to cause her to resume them. We withdrew the magnet, and the action was then transferred to the left hand, with the same characteristics as before. We gave the subject a piece of work to employ her hands, but she laid it down at regular intervals of three or four seconds, in order to make a long nose. From time to time she complained of pain, which oscillated from one side of the head to the other. This is an instance of a transferred act, which was suggested during somnambulism, and yet, had all the appearance of being spontaneous. The subject invented specious reasons to explain her conduct; she said that the bust was offensive, and believed that she made a long nose at it for this reason. As we have observed, when she paused, it was only necessary to imitate the gesture in order to re-charge the subject, and make her resume the insult. This proves the force of example, or rather, the influence of the representation of the movement on the movement.
The ensuing experiment defines the result of the transference, and shows that the transferred act is symmetrical with the suggested act. We impressed on a hypnotized subject the idea of setting down figures in the ordinary way, with her right hand, and at the same time a magnet was concealed near her left hand. On awaking, she wrote as far as the figure 12 with her right hand, then she hesitated, changed the pen to her left hand, and went on writing. The figures she set
down were correct when seen in a mirror, so that the movements executed with the left hand were symmetrical with those made with the right hand. The magnet had therefore transferred the action. It should be observed that while she was writing with the left hand, she was unable to use the right; she was as it were left-handed with her right hand.
Fig. 13. — Experiment on June 16, 1884. Magnetic transfer of impulse to write.
Fig. 13 represents the first experiment of the transfer of writing. These figures were set down with the left hand. Only the three first figures are reversed.
Fig. 14.— Experiment of November 29, 1884. Magnetic transfer of impulse of writing.
Fig. 14 represents a subsequent experiment. The subject had improved; the first line of figures was written with the right hand, and that below with the left, set down from left to right. The figure 7 is absent, because it had been suppressed by suggestion in a previous experiment. The reversed writing produced by the magnet demands attention. This phenomenon
is due to the fact that the magnet has transferred the impulse to set down figures from right to left and reversed writing is the normal writing of the left hand. This fact has been proved by many experiments. The transfer of verbal impulse, which is in fact only a variety of the motor impulse, may also be effected. We suggested to a subject that she should count aloud, up to 100. She began to count as soon as she awoke. A ten-forked magnet was placed near her right arm. When she got to 72 she paused, hesitated, could not go on counting, and at the end of a minute she was unable to speak at all. Yet she could move her tongue, and understand what was said to her. After ten minutes had elapsed, the magnet was applied to her left side; in about two minutes the left arm began to tremble and the power of speech returned.
Finally, let us note the transfer of resolutions, that is, of proposed, but unfulfilled acts. We said to X— when under somnambulism: "Here is the key of the wardrobe at the end of the room. When we offer you the key, you will take it in your right hand; you will open the drawer, take out a box, close the drawer, and finally give the box to B—: all with the right hand." On awaking the subject, a magnet was placed near her right forearm. After a few moments X— complained of pain in the right parietal region; pain which traversed the head and passed into the same region on the left. A minute afterwards we offered her the key; she took it in her left hand, walked to the wardrobe and attempted to open it with her right hand, but was unable to do so. She had recourse to her left hand in order to open the drawer, and she went through the same process before
taking the box; she alternately extended the right and left hand, and finally made use of the latter. She closed the drawer, after the same hesitation with the left hand, came back with the box, stood before B—, and said, "Here is the box, sir," and offered it to him with her left hand. We repeated this experiment a second time, allowing five minutes to intervene before presenting the key, so that the transfer might be completely effected. In this case the subject took the key in her left hand without the slightest hesitation, she opened the drawer, took out the box, closed the drawer and gave the box to B— without any attempt to use the right hand.
We have here a peculiar kind of transfer. There is a resolution to perform an act, which is in some sense present in the subject's cerebral cells. This virtual act is susceptible of transference, precisely like an act which is actually accomplished, and this clearly shows that it has likewise a material substratum. We should also observe the phenomenon of pain which accompanies the transfer; a pain which is not diffused but local, and according to the theories of cranio-cerebral topography already established by one of the present writers, the pain is localized in the ascending frontal and parietal convolutions, in the motor centres of the limbs. It will be remembered that the pain which accompanies the transfer of an act has the same localization. This resemblance seems to show that the resolution to perform an act with a given limb, with the right arm for example, corresponds with a physiological process which has the same site as the movement of the arm. The potential act — and a resolution to act is nothing else — seems to
have the same cerebral centre as the act which is really performed. It must be understood that we give this interpretation with all reserve, and that it is merely an hypothesis.
Finally, the magnet exerts its special action on spontaneous phenomena, which have not merely the appearance of being freely displayed, but are really voluntary, in the ordinary sense of the word. In fact transference may be effected without the hypnotic sleep or suggestion. The subject is merely requested to perform a given act, and the application of the magnet will compel him to perform a second act, symmetrical with the former. We give the experiment without further comment.
X— was perfectly awake, and had not been hypnotized for several days. We begged her to rest her right elbow on the table, close to a concealed magnet. She asked the reason, and we made the pretext of a wish to take her portrait, to which she agreed. After two or three minutes, she brought her right arm close to her body, saying that she was tired and that her arm was numb. She seemed uncertain for a moment, and looked to the right and left. We begged her to resume her position, and she said she had forgotten what it was; in another minute she rested her left elbow on a chair she had drawn up, in a position symmetrical to the former one. When the magnet was withdrawn, consecutive oscillations were observed.
The magnet will likewise effect a bilateral act: the result differs according to the simply automatic, character of this act, or its correspondence with the emotional state; in the former case it produces what we have
called a motor polarization, and in the second case an emotional polarization.
We first give an example of motor polarization. The idea is suggested to a subject that he should move both his hands as if rolling a ball. While he is continuing this action, a magnet is brought close to the nape of the neck. After a while both hands begin to tremble; the subject tries to roll his fingers without being able to do so, and seems at a loss what to do. The suggested impulse is succeeded by a corresponding paralysis. Many other experiments might be cited, in which the impulse is likewise changed into paralysis.
When motor polarization is compared with sensory polarization, it will be seen that they are at once alike and unlike. When the vision of the colour red is polarized, three effects are produced: suppression of this vision, paralysis, as far as red is concerned, and the subjective consciousness of the complementary colour, green. When an automatic movement is polarized the two effects of suppression and of paralysis are indeed produced, but the production of an inverse, complementary phenomenon corresponding with the colour green, appears to be absent. This gap is more apparent than real, and we shall presently attempt to fill it.
We must now give an instance of emotional polarization. We impressed the idea on a hypnotized subject that she would on awaking feel a desire to strike F . A magnet was placed near her right foot. As soon as she awoke, she looked uneasily at F , got up suddenly, and tried to give him a slap which he had just time to ward off. "I do not know why," she said passionately, "but I feel a desire to strike him," and indeed she tried
hard to do so. In another moment her countenance changed, she assumed a gentle and supplicating expression, threw herself on the experimenter, saying, "I want to embrace him," and it was necessary to use force to restrain her impulse. Consecutive oscillations were then observed.
In this last experiment, the magnet directly polarized the suggested emotion, which in its transformation led to a fresh series of acts. This is an emotional, not a motor polarization, a distinction which should be clearly understood. The magnet, if it acted solely on a motor phenomenon, such as the act of striking, would not substitute for it phenomena of another order, such as the act of embracing: for the opposition of these two acts is due to the difference in the emotion they express, and not to the difference in their motor character. The state of emotion is therefore the pivot on which the experiment turns.
The analysis of this emotional polarization will show that it consists of the three elements mentioned above: suppression, paralysis, and manifestation of the converse state. When we compare these facts with those obtained from the polarization of colours, we shall see that there are complementary emotions, just as there are complementary colours.*